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Where one searches for the hidden beneath the apparent, a position of mastery is established.  
—Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics1
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of emancipation plays a central role in modern education. To the extent 
that education is about more than the transmission of content and culture but 
involves an interest in fostering independence and autonomy, education can be said to 
be a process that aims at the emancipation of the child or the student. This is not only 
true of those traditions within educational theory and practice that are informed by an 
explicit political agenda. It can be said of any approach that acknowledges that there is 
a fundamental distinction between education and indoctrination. Although there is 
likely to be widespread support among educators for the "sentiment" of 
emancipation, there may well be quite different views about what emancipation 
actually entails and how it can be achieved through educational processes and 
practices. My purpose in this essay is twofold. First, I wish to articulate and 
problematize what I see as the prevailing understanding of emancipation in modern 
educational thought. Against this background I will then sketch the outlines of a 
different conception of emancipation, one which might be able to overcome some of 
the problems and contradictions within the prevailing view. To develop the 
contours of this new "logic" of emancipation I will draw upon Michel Foucault's 
work and, to a lesser extent, that of Jacques Rancière. This essay is an attempt to 
think emancipation differently and to begin to explore how and why this might 
matter for education.  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION 
The concept of emancipation stems from Roman law, where it referred to the 
freeing of a son or wife from the legal authority of the paterfamilias — the father of 
the family. Emancipation literally means to give away ownership (ex: away; 
mancipum: ownership). More broadly it means to relinquish one's authority over 
someone else. This implies that the "object" of emancipation, that is, the person to be 
emancipated, becomes independent and free as a result of the "act" of emancipation. 
This is reflected in the legal use of the term today, where emancipation means the 
freeing of someone from the control of another, particularly parents relinquishing 
authority and control over a minor child. In the seventeenth century emancipation 
became used in relation to religious toleration, in the eighteenth century in relation 
to the emancipation of slaves, and in the nineteenth century in relation to the 
emancipation of women and workers.2 Yet the Roman use of the term already 
indicates the link with education, in that emancipation marks the moment when and 
the process through which the (dependent) child becomes an (independent) adult. 
A decisive step in the history of emancipation was taken in the eighteenth 
century when emancipation became intertwined with the Enlightenment and 
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enlightenment became understood as a process of emancipation. We can see this 
most clearly in Irnmanuel Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment?" in which he 
defined enlightenment as "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage" and saw 
tutelage or immaturity as "man's inability to make use of his understanding without 
the direction from another."3 Immaturity is self-incurred, Kant wrote, "when its 
cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without the 
direction from another."4 Enlightenment thus entailed a process of becoming 
independent or autonomous, and for Kant this autonomy was based on one's use of 
reason. Kant contributed two further ideas to this line of thinking. First, he argued 
that the "propensity and vocation to free thinking" was not a contingent, historical 
possibility, but should be seen as something that was an inherent part of human 
nature; it was man's "ultimate destination" and the "aim of his existence."5 To block 
progress in enlightenment was therefore "a crime against human nature."6 Second, 
Kant argued that in order for this "capacity" to emerge, we need education. In his 
view the human being can only become human — a rational autonomous being — 
"through education."7
Kant's position clearly exemplifies what I refer to as the modern educational 
nexus: a set of interlocking ideas that characterizes modern educational thinking and 
that, through both education and psychology, has had a profound impact on modern 
educational practice. Kant assumes that there is a fundamental difference between 
immature and mature beings and that this difference maps onto the distinction 
between childhood and adulthood. He defines maturity in terms of rationality — the 
(proper) use of one's reason — and sees rationality as the basis for independence and 
autonomy. Education is seen as the lever for the transition from immaturity to 
maturity, which, in turn, means that education is intimately connected with the 
question of freedom. All this is aptly summarized in Kant's formulation of the 
"educational paradox": "How do I cultivate freedom through coercion?"8
From this point onward we can trace the history of emancipation along two 
related lines: one is educational, the other philosophical. The idea that education is 
not about the insertion of the individual into the existing order but entails an 
orientation toward autonomy and freedom played an important role in the establishment 
of education as an academic discipline in Germany in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. It also was a central element in "Reformpädagogik," "New 
Education," and "Progressive Education," which emerged in the first decades of the 
twentieth century in many countries. In most cases the argument against adaptation 
was expressed as an argument in favor of the child. Many educationalists followed 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's insight that adaptation to the external societal order would 
corrupt the child. This led to the idea, however, that a choice for the child could only 
mean a choice against society. This was further supported by theories that conceived of 
"the child" as a natural category, a "given," and not as something that had to be 
understood in social, historical, or political terms. 
Whereas the idea that education is about the emancipation of the individual 
child helped the development of education as an academic discipline, the limitations of 
this view became painfully clear when it turned out that such an approach could 
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easily be adopted by any ideological system, including Nazism and fascism. This is 
why, after the Second World War, educationalists — first of all in Germany — began to 
argue that there could be no individual emancipation without wider societal 
transformation. This became the central tenet of critical approaches to education. In 
Germany, a major contribution came from Klaus Mollenhauer, whose critical-
emancipatory approach drew inspiration from the work of Jürgen Habermas.9 Two 
decades later, but with precursors in the writings of John Dewey, George Counts, 
and Paulo Freire, a similar body of work emerged in North America, particularly 
through the contributions of Michael Apple, Henry Giroux, and Peter McLaren. 
As a critical theory of education, the emancipatory interest of critical pedagogies 
focuses on the analysis of oppressive structures, practices, and theories. The key idea is 
that emancipation can be brought about if people gain an adequate insight into the 
power relations that constitute their situation — which is why the notion of 
demystification plays such a central role in critical pedagogies.10 It is here that we can 
link up the history of emancipation with philosophy, at least to the extent that this 
history is part of the development of Marxism and neo-Marxist philosophy. It is, after 
all, a key insight of this tradition that in order to liberate ourselves from the oppressive 
workings of power and achieve emancipation, we first and foremost need to expose how 
power operates. What the Marxist tradition adds to this — and thereby has influenced 
critical and emancipatory pedagogies — is the notion of ideology. Although the 
question of the exact meaning of this concept is a topic of ongoing debates, one of 
the crucial insights expressed in it is not only that all thought is socially determined 
— remember Karl Marx's dictum that "it is not the consciousness of man that 
determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness"11 — but also, and more importantly, that ideology is thought "which 
denies this determination."12
The latter claim is linked to Friedrich Engels's notion of false consciousness: the 
idea that "the real motives impelling [the agent] remain unknown to him."13 The 
"predicament of ideology" lies in the suggestion that it is precisely because of the 
way in which power works upon our consciousness, that we are unable to see how 
power works upon our consciousness.14 This not only implies that in order to free 
ourselves from the workings of power we need to expose how power works upon our 
consciousness. It also means that in order for us to achieve emancipation, someone 
else, whose consciousness is not subjected to the workings of power, needs to 
provide us with an account of our objective condition. According to this logic, 
therefore, emancipation is contingent upon the truth about our objective condition, a 
truth that can only be generated by someone who is positioned outside of the 
influence of ideology — and in the Marxist tradition this position is considered to be 
occupied through either science or philosophy. 
| THREE CONTRADICTIONS 
What this brief history of emancipation begins to reveal are the contours of a 
certain logic of emancipation, a certain way in which emancipation is conceived and 
understood. There are several aspects to this logic. One is that emancipation requires an 
intervention from the outside; an intervention, moreover, by someone who is not 
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subjected to the power that needs to be overcome. This not only shows that 
emancipation is understood as something that is done to somebody. It also reveals 
that emancipation is based upon a fundamental inequality between the emancipator 
and the one to be emancipated. Equality, on this account, becomes the outcome of 
emancipation; it becomes something that lies in the future. Moreover, it is this 
outcome that is used to legitimize the interventions of the emancipator. Whereas this 
view of emancipation follows more or less directly from philosophical consider-
ations, particularly around the notion of ideology, it is not too difficult to recognize a 
particular pedagogy in this account as well. This is a pedagogy in which the teacher 
knows and students do not know yet; in which it is the task of the teacher to explain the 
world to the students and it is the task of the students to ultimately become as 
knowledgeable as the teacher. We can say, therefore, that the logic of emancipation is 
also the logic of a particular pedagogy.15 Although much of this will sound familiar — 
which, in a sense, proves how influential this modern logic of emancipation has been 
— this logic of emancipation is not without problems or, more precisely, it is not 
without contradictions. 
The first contradiction is that although emancipation is orientated toward 
equality, independence, and freedom, it actually installs dependency at the very 
heart of the act of emancipation. The one to be emancipated is, after all, dependent 
upon the intervention of the emancipator, an intervention based upon a knowledge 
that is fundamentally inaccessible to the one to be emancipated. When there is no 
intervention there is, therefore, no emancipation. This does raise the question of 
when this dependency will actually disappear. Is it as soon as emancipation is 
achieved? Or should the one who is emancipated remain eternally grateful to his or 
her emancipator for the "gift" of emancipation? Should slaves remain grateful to 
their masters for setting them free? Should women remain grateful to men for setting 
them free? Should children remain grateful to their parents for setting them free?16 Or 
could all of them perhaps have asked why they were not considered to be free in the 
first place? 
Modern emancipation is not only based upon dependency — it is also based 
upon a fundamental inequality between the emancipator and the one to be emanci-
pated. According to the modern logic of emancipation the emancipator is the one 
who knows better and best and who can perform the act of demystification that is 
needed to expose the workings of power. According to the modern logic of emanci-
pation the emancipator does not simply occupy a superior position. It could even be 
argued that in order for this superiority to exist the emancipator actually needs the 
inferiority of the one to be emancipated.17 Again we can ask when this inequality will 
actually disappear. After all, as long as the master remains a master, the slave can 
only ever become a former slave or an emancipated slave — but not a master. 
The third contradiction has to do with the fact that although emancipation takes place 
in the interest of those to be emancipated, it is based upon a fundamental distrust 
of and suspicion about their experiences. The logic of emancipation dictates, after all, 
that we cannot really trust what we see or feel, but that we need someone else to tell 
us what it is that we are really experiencing and what our problems  
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really are. And once more we can ask what it would mean for those "waiting" 
for their emancipation to be told the "truth" about themselves, their situation, and 
their problems.  
These contradictions not only permeate the general logic of emancipation; they 
are also present in this logic's manifestation in a particular modem — or, as Rancière 
has argued, progressive — pedagogy.18
The ambition of this essay is to explore whether we can think emancipation 
differently and, more specifically, whether we can do so in a way that is able to 
overcome the contradictions of the modern logic of emancipation. Now that we 
know what the modern logic of emancipation looks like and what its contradictions 
are, I wish to turn to Foucault's work in order to proceed toward the articulation of a 
different conception of emancipation. 
FOUCAULT'S METHODOLOGY 
Many would argue that Foucault has helped us to understand the workings of 
power in a new, different, and deeper way and that, for precisely this reason, he has 
made a major contribution to the work of demystification and emancipation. If we 
read Foucault only as a new theory of power, this conclusion is probably correct. But 
what complicates the matter is that Foucault's writings on power not only have 
implications at the level of theory but also at the level of our very understanding of 
theory and critique; that is, at the level of methodology. At this level Foucault's 
writings about power and knowledge entail an explicit rejection of the idea that we 
can use knowledge to combat power. Central to this argument is his rejection of the 
Manichean foundations of the Enlightenment that are expressed in the idea that 
power and knowledge are ontologically separate "entities" and that emancipation 
consists in the "victory" of knowledge over power.19 For Foucault power and 
knowledge always come together — something that is expressed in his notion of 
"power/knowledge." Thus, he argued that we should abandon "a whole tradition 
that allows us to imagine that knowledge can only exist where the power relations are 
suspended."20
This is not to say that for Foucault change is no longer possible, or knowledge 
has become futile. But what it does signify is the end of the 'innocence' of 
knowledge, the end of the idea that knowledge is pure, simple, or uncontaminated by 
power and thus can be used to reveal how power operates. Foucault urges us to 
acknowledge that we are always operating within fields of power/knowledge — of 
power/knowledge against power/knowledge, not of power against knowledge or 
knowledge against power. This implies, however, that any application of Foucault's 
theory of power should not be understood as a contribution to demystification. It is, 
therefore, not an avenue toward overcoming the workings of power.21
Does this mean that for Foucault we live in an iron cage with no escape possible? Is 
it the case, as some critics have argued, that Foucault's work has an "anaesthetizing 
effect," because the "implacable logic" of it leaves "no possible room for 
initiative"?22 These questions only make sense as long as we assume that it is 
possible to occupy a place outside of the system from which we can analyze and 
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criticize the system. They only make sense, in other words, as long as we assume that 
knowledge is "outside" of or "beyond" power. But what Foucault has urged us to do, is 
precisely to move beyond this inside-outside thinking. There is, still, potential for 
action, change, and critique, but it requires an approach that is distinctively different 
from the Enlightenment approach. According to Foucault it is true "that we have to 
give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any 
complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits." But 
this does not mean that there is nothing to do. Foucault agrees that criticism "consists of 
analyzing and reflecting upon limits." But, 
if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge had to renounce 
transgressing.. .the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is 
given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is 
singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?23
Foucault refers to this approach as "eventalization." He characterizes it as a 
"breach of self-evidence": "It means making visible a singularity at places where 
there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological 
trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all." Rather than looking 
for a single explanation of particular facts or events, eventalization works "by 
constructing around the singular event...a 'polygon' or rather a 'polyhedron' of 
intelligibility, the number of whose faces is not given in advance and can never 
properly be taken as finite." Eventalization thus means to complicate and pluralize 
our understanding of events, their elements, their relations and their domains of 
reference. It does, therefore, not result in a "deeper" understanding, an understanding 
of underlying structures or causes. In this respect eventalization does not generate 
a kind of knowledge that will set us free from the workings of those structures or 
causes. But Foucault has been adamant that this does not mean that such analysis is 
without effect.24
What eventalization does not generate is advice or guidelines or instructions. 
But it can bring about a situation in which people '"no longer know what they do,' so 
that the acts, gestures, discourses which up until then had seemed to go without 
saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous" — and this effect is entirely 
intentional.25 Foucauldian analysis therefore does not result in a deeper or more true 
understanding of how power works — it only tries to unsettle what is taken for 
granted — nor does it aim to produce recipes for action. Rather than replacing 
judgment it actually opens up a space and in a sense even a demand for judgment. 
And rather than taking some experiences and interpretations as more true and valid 
than others, eventalization can actually validate everyone's experiences. 
This kind of analysis is therefore not meant to solve problems, nor to give 
reformers and emancipators the knowledge to make the world better. It is meant for the 
subjects who act. As Foucault explains: 
Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what 
needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse 
what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It 
doesn't have to lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage of programming. It is a challenge 
directed to what is.26
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WhatFoucault is arguing for is therefore not only a different style of critique but 
also a different audience for critique. He does not want to provide demystified 
insights that can be used by emancipators to set others free. Rather, he wishes to 
connect to those who are struggling to make different ways of being and doing 
possible — that is, "the only important problem is what happens on the ground."27 In 
more practical terms the crucial step is to show — and in a sense, through 
experimentation and action actually prove — that things can be different, that the 
way in which things are is only one, limited possibility. This, in turn, opens up the 
possibility "of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think" — and in 
precisely this sense, as Foucault has put it, "it is seeking to give a new impetus... to the 
undefined work of freedom."28
TOWARD A NEW LOGIC OF EMANCIPATION 
"Old" emancipation — the emancipation of the modern tradition — is based 
upon what we might call a vertical way of thinking. It talks about underlying 
structures, about deeper insights, about lifting people from the workings of power, 
and it puts the emancipator as a master-explicator in a position above the everyday 
world. Old emancipation is based upon what Gaston Bachelard has called a "science of 
the hidden," a science which fundamentally distrusts experiences and appear-
ances.29 Moreover old emancipation, as I have shown, is conceived as something that 
is done to people, as it is based upon a fundamental inequality and a relationship of 
dependency. 
With Foucault we can begin to see things differently. If the term is not too 
pretentious, we can refer to this set of ideas as "new" emancipation. The first thing to 
take from Foucault is the insight that there is no escape from power. But this, as I 
argued, is only a problem as long as we think that such an escape is possible. New 
emancipation is not an escape from power. If it is an escape at all, it is an escape — or 
better, a move — from one particular power/knowledge constellation to another. This 
other power/knowledge constellation might in some respects be better, but it is not 
itself beyond power. Yet actually making the move is of crucial importance because 
it proves that the existing power/knowledge constellation was not a necessity but 
just one contingent, historical possibility. This, in turn, implies that new 
emancipation is not something that is done to people but instead is something that is 
done by people. Hence new emancipation no longer relies on a relationship of 
dependency. People need not wait until their emancipators tell them that they can 
move; they can make the move right here and right now.30 This also shows that new 
emancipation starts from the assumption of equality, in that everyone is considered to 
be able to make the move. This is not to suggest that society is equal. But what it aims 
to do is to take away from the logic of emancipation the idea that there is a 
fundamental, almost ontological inequality that only can be overcome through the 
interventions of the emancipator. Finally, new emancipation no longer works as a 
science of the hidden. It can take experiences and appearances seriously. This does not 
mean that they have to be accepted as they are, but it does mean that it is no longer the 
case that some experiences and appearances — or, more importantly, the 
experiences of some — are, by definition, invalid. New emancipation, we might say, 
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begins to work on a science of the visible — a phrase that resonates with Rancière's 
notion of the politics of aesthetics. All this suggests that whereas the logic of old 
emancipation can be characterized as a vertical logic, the logic of new emancipation 
might best be characterized as a horizontal logic, a "topology that [precisely] does 
not presuppose [a] position of mastery."31
IN CONCLUSION 
I am aware that this essay may well raise more questions than it is able to answer. In 
a sense I would count that as a success, since my aim has been to see if it is possible to 
think emancipation differently. One of the most pressing questions, of course, is 
whether the new logic of emancipation outlined in this essay makes any sense in 
relation to our existing educational practices.32 Given that the old logic of emanci-
pation is so deeply engrained in our educational practices and intuitions, particularly 
because of its intimate connection with the modern educational nexus, it will take 
time before things will begin to shift, if they will shift at all. But if one lesson can be 
drawn from this analysis, it is that there is no need to wait for a master-
emancipator to step in before things can change. We can always just begin by doing 
things differently.33
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